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Abstract
The first generation local government reforms in Turkey partially granted discretion to local 
governments. However, they have largely failed to improve downward accountability towards citizens. 
In 2012, the government has embarked on the second generation reforms which aimed to achieve 
economies of scale in municipal service provision through municipal amalgamation. The government 
redesigned the configuration of municipalities, abolished special provincial administrations in 
metropolitan municipal jurisdictions and converted villages to neighborhoods of municipalities. This 
paper extends the earlier analysis on local government discretion and accountability to these recent 
changes. The main focus of the paper is on fiscal discretion and accountability since these changes have 
mostly affected the fiscal structure of local governments. Analyzing the data issued by the Ministry 
of Finance, the preliminary results show that local governments have become more dependent on 
intergovernmental transfers.
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Öz
Türkiye’de 2000 yılı sonrasında yapılan yerel yönetim reformları bu idarelere kısmen takdir hakkı 
tanırken, vatandaşlara yönelik aşağı doğru hesapverilebilirlik açısından önemli ölçüde başarısız 
kalmıştır. 2012 yılında hükümet yerel yönetimlerin birleştirilmesi yoluyla hizmet sunumunda ölçek 
ekonomilerini gerçekleştirmek amacıyla ikinci bir düzenlemeyi gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu çerçevede, 
belediyeleri yeniden yapılandırılmış, büyükşehir belediyesi sınırlarındaki il özel idareleri kaldırılmış ve 
pek çok köy idaresi mahalleye dönüştürülmüştür. Bu çalışma, daha once Türkiye’de yerel yönetimlerin 
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takdir yetkisi ve hesap verilebilirliği üzerine yapılan analize parallel olarak, son değişikliklerin etkisini 
araştırmaktadır. Makale esas olarak yerel yönetimlerin gelirleri konusunda odaklanmaktadır zira 
yapılan düzenlemeler en çok mali yapıyı etkilemiştir. Maliye Bakanlığı tarafından yayınlanan verilerin 
analizi ile elde edilen ilk sonuçlar, yerel yönetimlerin yönetimler arası mali transferlere daha fazla 
bağımlı hale geldiğini göstermektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yerel Yönetim Reformu; Siyasal, İdari, Mali Takdir ve Hesapverilebilirlik; Yerel 
Yönetim Gelirleri; Türkiye
JEL Sınıflaması: H11, H70, H71, R51
1. Introduction
The Turkish government has implemented major local government reforms since 2004. The 
first generation reforms were intended to grant more discretion to local governments along 
the principles of democratic decentralization and improve downward accountability towards 
citizens (Yilmaz and Guner, 2013). We have argued that these reforms achieved limited success 
(Yilmaz and Guner, 2013). In this paper, we extend the analysis to the second generation reforms 
which aimed to achieve economies of scale in municipal service provision through reducing 
the number local government units significantly. The 2012 legislation on municipalities (law 
no 6360) 1 established new metropolitan and district municipalities, extended the municipal 
services area of metropolitan municipalities, amalgamated municipalities, abolished special 
provincial administrations in metropolitan municipal jurisdictions and converted villages to 
neighbourhoods of municipalities.
An important aspect of the second generation reforms is the amalgamation of municipalities 
without much analysis and consultation. 2 The main motivation of the government was to 
achieve economies of scale in municipal services as size economies are expected to improve 
regional planning and reduce the cost of service delivery in metropolitan areas. However, the 
changes ended up making municipalities more dependent on central government transfers 
and created local accountability deficit by removing the benefits of proximity contrary to the 
subsidiarity principle. In fact, the local government system has become more centralized at the 
local level, particularly at the metropolitan level (Akilli and Akilli, 2014; Savas-Yavuzcehre, 
2016).
This paper contributes to the debate on the size of local governments (Fox and Gurley, 2006) 
and the growing body of literature presenting the linkages between political, administrative, and 
fiscal dimensions of decentralization (Smoke, 2015a, 2015b; Local Development International, 
1 Law on the Establishment of Fourteen Metropolitan Municipalities and Twentyseven Disticts and 
Amendments made in Certain Laws and Decrees, No.6360.
2 The preambles of Act No. 6360 describes the main objectives of the law as “avoiding problems about 
planning and coordination among too many units, benefiting economies of scale, inadequate capacity 
and financial weakness of small size municipalities...”
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2013; Beris and Serrano-Berthet, 2010; Schneider, 2003).  3 After this brief introduction section 2 
presents a summary of the recent changes in the Turkish local government system. Section 3 and 
4 discusses the changes in the political and administrative setting respectively. Section 5 analyses 
the impact of the 2012 legislation on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. The last section 
concludes the paper with general observations.
2. Recent Changes in the Local Government System
Local government reforms in Turkey began with the introduction of a minimum population 
criterion of 750,000 in establishing a new metropolitan municipality in 2004. 4 In 2005, the 
government reformed both Special Provincial Administrations (SPAs) and municipalities to 
achieve better democratic representation at the local level. 5 Later in 2008, there has been a 
reduction in the number of municipalities—the number was reduced from 3,225 to 2,950. 6
In 2012, the government has introduced further changes in the local government system. 7 These 
changes kept the structure of local government system intact, but the number of local government 
units has been reduced significantly. The Law no. 6360 established new metropolitan and district 
municipalities and reduced the total number of municipalities to 1,397 from 2,950, a 53 percent 
reduction (see Table 1 and Figure 1). It enforced the population criterion of 750,000 of the 2004 
legislation to create new metropolitan municipalities and extended the geographic boundaries of 
metropolitan municipalities to cover the whole territory of their province. 8 The total number 
of metropolitan municipalities increased to 30 from 16. In addition, the law abolished the special 
provincial administration in these 30 provinces. 9 On the financing side, the percentage share of 
metropolitan municipalities’ transfers is increased to 6 from 5. 10
3 It also contributes to case study literature on the balance between local accountability and discretion. 
Other case studies analysing the impact of accountability and discretion linkages to broader local 
governance outcomes include Kerala, India (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2009), Ghana (Yilmaz, 2009), 
Philippines (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2013), Burkina Faso (Mahieu and Yilmaz, 2010), Tanzania (Yilmaz 
and Venugopal, 2010), Ethiopia (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2011), Pakistan (Aslam and Yilmaz, 2011), 
Turkey (Yilmaz and Guner 2013), and Sierra Leone (Edwards, Yilmaz and Boex, 2015).
4 The 2004 Metropolitan Municipality Law no.5216 updated the Metropolitan Municipality Law of 1984.
5 They aimed at separation of the executive arm of the SPAs from its deliberative arm. They allowed 
council members to elect the head of provincial council instead of having the provincial governor (vali), 
appointed by the central government. In the municipal sector, the Municipality Law no. 5393 devolved 
additional responsibilities to municipalities and increased the population threshold to establish a new 
municipality to 5,000 from 2,000.
6 The Law no. 5747 changed the status of small municipalities that do not meet the minimum population 
criterion of 2,000 and reorganized municipalities within the borders of metropolitan municipalities.
7 March 2014 local elections had more national political implications than local as they turned into 
a confidence vote for the ruling party because of the pre-election events of Gezi Park protests and 
political polarization in the country (Sadioglu, Dede and Yuceyilmaz, 2016).
8 Provinces and districts are the deconcenrated field administrations of the central government.
9 Instead, an investment monitoring and coordination directorate was established in these provinces 
under the management of the provincial governor.
10 These are derivation based general budget tax revenues collected in their jurisdiction.
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Within metropolitan municipalities, the law extended the boundaries of district municipalities 
to cover the whole territory of their district (both urban and rural areas), which means the 
rural share of the area they cover has increased proportionally. 11 The law also abolished all 
of the township municipalities within metropolitan municipality jurisdictions. 12 The villages 
within the boundaries of the 30 metropolitan municipality provinces were converted into 
neighbourhoods of district municipalities (approximately 16,000 villages). In provinces other 
than 30 metropolitan municipal provinces, township municipalities with population less than 
2000 were converted into villages. With these changes today more than 75 percent of the 
population live in 30 metropolitan municipality jurisdictions covering more than 50 percent of 
the geography of the country.
With the introduction of the second generation local government reforms 13, Turkey has 
joined other OECD countries in redrawing the map of local government. 14 Despite the 
weaknesses of the theoretical rationale (Fox and Gurley, 2006) and “municipal amalgamation 
has undergone surprisingly little systemic evaluation” in the world (Blom-Hansen, Houlberg, 
Serritzlew and Triesman, 2016: 812), the government of Turkey has drastically reduced the 
number of municipalities through amalgamation—by 53 percent. The policy objective of the 
reform is described as achieving better territorial management. 15 However, the optimal size of 
local governments has been debated in the literature without a consensus on a particular size 
(Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Hooghe and Mark, 2009; Triesman, 2007). Part of the difficulty is the 
measurement of economic benefits of amalgamation as certain local services favour large size 
and others favour smaller size. That is the reason we analyse the impact of the recent changes 
in Turkey by employing a multi-dimensional local governance framework (Beris and Serrano-
Berthet, 2010). The diagnostic framework employs political, administrative, and fiscal lenses to 
analyse the whole intergovernmental architecture. 16 The paper is based on information gathered 
during interviews with central and local government authorities by authors and analysis of 
municipal financial data provided by the Ministry of Finance. 17
11 Until this law, the policy choice of previous governments was to have municipalities provide urban 
services and deconcentrated local administrations and SPAs provide services in rural areas of the same 
province.
12 In the original metropolitan municipality model of 1984, metropolitan municipalities were responsible 
only for service provision in the urban areas of their province.
13 Although Law no 6360 was issued in 2012, it was put into effect with the March 2014 local elections.
14 See Blom-Hansen, Houlberg, Serritzlew and Treisman (2016) for a review of municipal mergers in the 
OECD countries over the last five decades.
15 Unlike the past reforms, which were reactionary in nature (reaction to urbanization), this time the 
government intended to proactively manage the territory.
16 The framework allows analysing each of the three dimensions of intergovernmental design in depth. 
Otherwise it does not suggest a sequence. For an examination of outcomes of different sequence options 
see Falleti (2005).
17 The authors conducted semi-structured interviews with central and local government officials in 2016.
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Table 1: Types of Municipalities by Population (Before and After the Enforcement of the Law No 6360)*
Population Metropolitan Provincial Metropolitan District District Township Total Population
0–2,000
2012 64 945 1,009
2016 1 40 46 87 143,435
2,000–5,000
2012 196 845 1,041
2016 12 126 316 454 1,352,110
5,000–10,000
2012 6 181 138 325
2016 37 98 33 168 1,158,454
10,000–20,000
2012 1 8 179 43 231
2016 1 77 68 2 148 2,140,602
20,000–50,000
2012 6 20 62 4 92
2016 6 146 51 203 6,400,916
50,000–100,000
2012 19 15 50 2 86
2016 15 77 14 106 7,524,207
100,000-250,000
2012 29 31 17 77
2016 26 91 3 120 18,422,275
250,000-500,000
2012 1 8 44 53
2016 3 58 61 21,805,837
5 0 0 , 0 0 0 -
1,000,000
2012 5 2 19 26
2016 10 20 30 21,906,758
1,000,000 +
2012 10 10
2016 20 20 51,630,619
Total
2012 16 65 143 749 1,977 2,950
2016 30 51 519 400 397 1,397
* The Law no 6360 was issued on December 6, 2012 but came into effect after the March 2014 local elections.
Source: Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Local Authorities, General Activity Report for Local 
Authorities for 2012 and 2014.
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Figure 1: Decentralization and Deconcentration Structures in Turkey (Before and After the 
Enforcement of the Law No 6360)
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3. Local Political Setting and Accountaility
According to our framework, political setting is an important determinant of accountability 
(Yilmaz et al., 2010). It enables citizens to participate in the political process to hold local 
elected officials to account. We argue that the recent reforms conflict with democratic principles 
of the European Charter of Local Self Government 18 as amalgamation of municipalities and 
expansion of the metropolitan areas have removed the benefit of proximity—the main tenet of 
the Charter.
An important issue in terms of political accountability is the way the reforms were introduced. 
The government employed a centralized top-down approach and abolished nearly half of the 
municipalities without holding referendum or consulting the citizens, in direct violation of the 
European Charter. 19 Thus some criticize this heavy handed approach and describe the changes 
as centralized decentralization (Arıkboğa, 2013).
In terms of political setting, the biggest change was in the electoral map for metropolitan 
municipality mayors. With the extension of the metropolitan municipality boundaries, the whole 
population in the metropolitan provinces vote for metropolitan mayor. This change symbolically 
brings the elected metropolitan municipality mayor to the same level as the appointed governor 
of the province. This change politically strengthens municipalities vis-a-vis deconcentrated 
provincial administrations.
However, the 2012 legislation didn’t introduce changes in the relationship between the executive 
and legislative branches of metropolitan municipalities. The continuation of indirect election of 
metropolitan municipal councilors by district municipal councilors is a missed opportunity to 
address representation deficit. 20
Another major shortcoming of the recent reforms is the failure to address the weaknesses 
in the political representation to strengthen downward accountability mechanisms. There 
have been no changes in the existing system which promotes upward accountability of 
local elected officials towards their national party leadership. Current provincial and 
municipal council elections are based on party list where national party politics prevail 
over the preferences and priorities of localities. The national party caucus plays a dominant 
18 Turkey is a signatory to the charter which requires compliance with a minimum number of principles 
that form foundations of local democracy. The Charter lays down the principles of the democratic 
functioning of communities and establishes the principle of the transfer of competences to local 
communities—the decentralisation of power towards the level closest to the citizen. This principle is 
known as the principle of subsidiarity.
19 Article 5 of the Charter about the protection of local authority boundaries says “Changes in local 
authority boundaries shall not be made without prior consultation of the local communities concerned, 
possibly by means of a referendum where this is permitted by statute.”
20 The metropolitan municipality council is composed of district municipality mayors and a certain amount 
of council members from these district municipalities. Indirect election of metropolitan municipality 
councillors weakens direct accountability linkage between citizens and creates a representation deficit 
(Arıkboğa, 2014).
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role in determining the local political leadership and at times, local development agenda. 
Furthermore, there have been no changes in the first-past-the-post election system which 
favors candidates financially supported by political parties and puts independents in a 
disadvantageous situation. In case of council member elections, the continuing practice of 
ten-percent threshold hinders representation of all segments of the society through smaller 
parties and independent candidates. 21
The reforms have also failed to establish effective public participation and democratic practices 
(Gul, Kamalak and Kiris, 2016). Social accountability mechanisms to guard the integrity of local 
democratic governance continue to be defunct. Recalling elected officials requires a lengthy 
process initiated by local councils. 22 Term limits for elected officials and quotas for vulnerable 
groups such as women and ethnic and religious minorities do not exist. In addition, there is 
a gender inequality at the local level (see Table 2). Out of 30 metropolitan mayors only 3 are 
women. In municipal councils, the share of woman councillors is a mere 10.7 percent of the total 
number of councillors. Even though there is an increase in the ratio of women council members 
in the recent years (see Figure 2 and Table 2), 10.7 percent is a very low figure for a country where 
51 percent of the population are women.
Figure 2: Change in Women Municipal Council Members 1984-2014
21 Political parties and independents are required to receive at least one tenth of valid votes in an electoral 
district to be included in rewarding council seats. Political parties that receive less than ten percent 
of the votes in that local district will have no representation in the council. As a result, there is a huge 
variation in the average number of votes local councilors receive in each electoral district.
22 In both SPAs and municipalities, if the activity report of the previous year is rejected by their council by 
a supra majority (three fourths of the council members), the chair of council informs the Ministry of 
Interior for action against the governor/mayor. In municipalities since mayor is the chair of the council, 
the vice-chairman of municipal council is responsible to send the council’s decision to the governor of 
that province. Governor transmits the decision to the Council of State together with his/her opinion. 
The Council of State is the final decision making authority in removing the mayor from the office.
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Table 2: Gender Breakdown of Elected Local Officials (2014)
Male % Female % Total
Metropolitan Mayor 27 90.0 3 10.0 30
Metropolitan District Mayor 496 95.6 23 5.4 519
Provincial Municipal Mayor 50 98.0 1 2.0 51
District and Township Mayor 784 98.4 13 1.6 797
Municipal Council Member 18,300 89.3 2,198 10.7 20,498
Provincial Council Member 1,191 95.2 60 4.8 1,251
Village Headman 18,085 99.7 58 0.3 18,143
Village Council of Elders Member 79,689 98.8 1,007 1.2 80,696
Neighbourhood Headman 31,013 98.0 622 2.0 31,635
Neighbourhood Council of Elders Member 134,362 97.6 1,007 2.4 137,781
Source: Ministry of Interior, Directorate of Local Authorities. Available at http://www.migm.gov.tr/en/pub-
lications/LocalAuthoritiesinTurkey.pdf
4. Local Administrative Discretion and Accountability
Local administrative discretion and accountability is the indispensable aspect of promoting local 
economic development. The framework argues that local governments need to be endowed 
with administrative autonomy in order to be able to respond to local needs effectively (Yilmaz 
et al., 2010). The second generation reforms failed to underpin the assignment of powers and 
responsibilities to municipalities and to grant them a large degree of autonomy in managing their 
affairs.  23
In terms of administrative reform, the only change was the establishment of a new administrative 
unit to coordinate central government investments in provinces where SPAs are abolished: 
Directorate of Investment Monitoring and Coordination (DIMC). DIMCs operate under the 
purview of provincial governor. 24 The main responsibility of the directorate is to monitor 
and coordinate central government ministries’ investment and service provision activities in 
provinces. 25
23 The Constitution empowers the central government over local government affairs. Article 127 
grants administrative tutelage power to the central government “in the framework of principles and 
procedures set forth by law with the objective of ensuring the functioning of local services with the 
principle of integral unity of the administration, securing uniform public service, safeguarding public 
interest and meeting local needs in an appropriate manner.” The administrative tutelage may be in the 
form of pre-authorization, approval, execution of services on behalf of municipalities and removal of 
local leadership from the office. The Minister of Interior may remove mayors and local councillors 
from office in case of offence related to their duties In addition, all administrative actions of local 
governments are subject to the inspection of the Ministry of Interior (Yilmaz and Guner, 2013).
24 Governors decide whether they want to head the directorate or assign the responsibility to one of the 
deputy governors.
25 The legislation defines the organisational structure of DIMCs; it is composed of four technical 
(investment monitoring; guidance and inspections; strategy and coordination; emergency services) and 
two administrative (administrative and financial; natural resources, license and culture) departments.
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The abolishment of SPAs within metropolitan municipalities and creation of DIMCs took many by 
surprise. There had been no analysis and preparation for the transition from SPAs to DIMCs therefore 
there have been confusion about who would be responsible for ongoing investment projects as well as 
the civil service cadre of the previous special provincial administrations (Kuran, 2015).
5. Local Fiscal Discretion and Accountability
According to our framework, meaningful decentralization reform requires devolving certain level 
expenditure responsibilities to local government together with financial autonomy to finance 
local service delivery (Yilmaz et al., 2010). In Turkey, local governments have their devolved 
expenditure responsibilities; however, the recent reforms failed to address the lack of local taxation 
power issue. 26 Instead the reforms increased the intergovernmental transfer amount making local 
governments more dependent on central government transfers. On the accountability side, upward 
accountability structures are in place but downward accountability mechanisms are largely absent.
5.1. Expenditure Assignment
In Turkey, the share of local governments in total government expenditures and revenues is 
increasing (see Table 3). 27
Table 3: Local Government Revenues and Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP (%)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Revenues 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.9 4 3.4
Expenditures 3.4 3.4 3.6 4.1 3.8 4 3.8
Source: Ministry of Finance, General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control, http://www.bumko.gov.
tr/TR,187/mahalli-idareler.html
26 According to the Constitution, taxation power is only granted to the parliament and the council of 
ministers has the power to decide tax rate within the limits of a law enacted by the parliament. In 2011, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that municipalities don’t have the same right to decide a tax rate within 
the limits set by a law. However, the same Constitutional Court ruled in 2013 that municipalities have 
the right to set a tax rate within the limits set by a law. In 2014, the government issued a decree on 
setting the minimum and maximum limits for municipal revenues and authorized municipal councils 
to decide on the rate. However, the decree doesn’t necessarily empower municipal councils to make 
decision single-handedly. Municipal councils decide on rates for municipal revenues and send the 
decision to the Ministry of Interior, who shares it with the Ministry of Finance and submits it to the 
Council of Ministers for approval.
27 In Turkey, municipalities have mandatory and discretionary service delivery responsibilities. 
Mandatory responsibilities include local functions such as city development plan, water and sewage, 
urban transportation, zoning, geographical and urban information systems, environmental, solid waste 
collection, parks and recreation, cultural and sports services, municipal police, fire fighting, emergency 
services, funeral and cemetery services and vocational training. Discretionary responsibilities include 
social functions such as maintenance of public schools, provision of healthcare, preservation of cultural 
assets, and protection of historical sites. Service delivery responsibilities of metropolitan municipalities 
include city development plan, issuance of business permits, urban transportation, maintenance of 
major transportation arteries, firefighting, water and sewage, cemetery and other various services.
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The recent reforms failed to address the confusion in service delivery responsibilities between 
metropolitan and district municipalities. In metropolitan areas, the municipality law assigns 
certain local services to district municipalities. However, district municipalities within the 
boundaries of metropolitan municipalities and metropolitan municipalities have certain common 
responsibilities. It is confusing for citizens who are responsible from which service as district and 
metropolitan municipalities have concurrent responsibilities.
In addition, the extension of geographic boundaries of metropolitan and district municipalities 
without changing service delivery responsibilities defies the logic of the original metropolitan 
governance model in achieving economies of scale in service provision (Arıkboğa, 2013). 
Although the abolishment of small township municipalities and extension of geographic 
boundaries of district and metropolitan municipalities helped to achieve economies of scale 
in service provision; the division of service delivery responsibilities between metropolitan 
and district municipalities has not changed. The original 1984 design of metropolitan model 
intentionally established a hierarchy by putting the metropolitan municipality over district 
municipalities to achieve economies of scale and assigned certain services, like landfill 
management, construction and maintenance of main arteries, to the metropolitan municipality. 
However, the extension of geographic boundaries of district municipalities without changing 
the service delivery responsibilities appears to question the logic of the original municipal 
governance model (Arıkboğa, 2013). One can easily argue that the economies of scale argument 
to have metropolitan municipalities doesn’t hold any more with these changes. The geographic 
and population size of district municipalities have been enlarged enough to achieve economies of 
scale in the provision of services originally assigned to metropolitan municipalities.
5.2. Revenue Assignment
Decentralization of expenditure responsibilities brings with it the need for establishing a local 
revenue system which conforms to theoretically-accepted normative principles. The Turkish 
local government system has mixed properties according to the three-step evaluation proposed 
by Ebel and Taliercio (2005). According to their framework, the initial step is the application 
of public finance theory. From the public finance theory perspective, the Turkish local revenue 
system has stabilization, international trade and insurance properties. The central government 
keeps the broad-based taxes on consumption (value-added tax) and income (personal income 
and corporate income) for itself as stabilization tools. In terms of international trade, the only 
authority controlling international trade taxes is the central government. Levying customs duties 
is the central government prerogative. Central government also performs insurance functions in 
case of exogenous shocks.
The second step is the application of benefits framework. The benefits logic argues that local 
revenue system should be designed to have the beneficiaries of local services to pay for them. 
The benefits of local services can either be specific to the direct user or generalized to a broader 
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community. In Turkey, local governments have both specific benefit revenues (user charges and 
fees) and generalized benefits taxation tools (property tax). These are own source revenues of 
local governments. On average, nearly 40 percent of local government revenues come from their 
own sources (see Table 4). However, there is a big difference between municipalities and SPAs. For 
SPAs own source revenues are a negligible amount. They are heavily dependent on conditional 
transfers (see Table 5). Whereas, for municipalities own source revenues 28 are nearly half of their 
revenues; the other half is unconditional block transfers. Conditional transfers are less than one 
percent of total municipal revenues.
Table 4: Local Government Revenues (%)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Own source revenue 38.60 38.22 37.90 37.99 39.63 35.79 36.92
Unconditional transfers 46.40 45.93 47.43 45.82 52.24 56.91 55.87
Conditional transfers 15.00 15.85 14.67 16.19 8.13 7.30 7.21
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Calculated by the authors from data on www.muhasebat.gov.tr (Ministry of Finance General Dire-
ctorate of Public Accounts)
Table 5: Municipal and SPA Revenues (%)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
SPA M SPA M SPA M SPA M SPA M SPA M SPA M
Own source 
revenue 7 48 8 47 8 46 8 47 8 43 9 39 8 40
Unconditional 
transfers 28 52 25 52 27 53 24 52 25 55 29 60 30 59
Conditional 
transfers 65 1 68 1 65 1 68 1 67 1 63 2 63 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
28 Municipalities have four different types of own revenues: taxes (on property, environmental cleaning, 
advertisement, communications, electricity and gas consumption and fire insurance), duties (on 
occupation license, holiday work license, spring waters license, town-crier, animal slaughter inspection 
and supervision, measure and weighing instruments inspection, building construction, business 
license, inspection and license report and health certificate), expenditure contribution charges (for 
road, sewage and water infrastructure construction) and fees (for all services performed upon the 
request of individual citizens that are not subject to duties and expenditure contribution shares). In 
addition to these municipalities have revenue income from profits of municipality owned corporations, 
rental income, and income from the sales of municipal assets. Municipalities have different levels 
of control over these revenue sources in terms of defining the base, setting the rate and collection 
autonomy within the constitutional limitations. Overall local governments have very limited autonomy 
in defining the base and rate of their own source revenue items.
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SPA= Special Province Administration; M=Municipality
Source: Calculated by the authors from data on www.muhasebat.gov.tr (Ministry of Finance General Di-
rectorate of Public Accounts)
The last step of the analysis is the revenue mobilization capacity. In a well-functioning local 
government finance system local governments have access to buoyant sources of revenue to 
finance their service delivery obligations. 29 In Turkey, the buoyancy of local government revenues 
has always fluctuated significantly from one year to another (Guner and Yilmaz, 2006). It seems 
that the fluctuation still continues after the 2012 legislation (see Table 6). This fluctuation in local 
revenues is a source of instability in revenues for local governments; it makes budget planning 
difficult for them.
Table 6: Buoyancy of Municipal and SPA Revenues
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
SPA M SPA M SPA M SPA1 M SPA M SPA M
Own source revenue 1.26 0.98 1.69 0.94 2.04 2.03 -4.48 0.60 1.44 0.32 -0.66 1.47
Unconditional transfers 1.03 1.08 1.34 1.41 1.48 1.66 -4.53 2.05 2.37 2.05 0.71 0.88
Conditional transfers 1.37 2.46 0.30 -1.72 3.14 4.31 -4.85 7.60 0.50 2.02 0.36 0.86
SPA= Special Province Administration; M=Municipality
Source: Calculated by the authors from data on www.muhasebat.gov.tr (Ministry of Finance General Di-
rectorate of Public Accounts) and www.tuik.gov.tr (Turkish Statistical Institute)
The composition of municipal revenues significantly differs across different categories of 
municipalities (see Table 7). Although transfers constitute the main bulk of revenue for all 
categories of municipalities, metropolitan municipalities are more dependent on transfers 
than other types of municipalities. The dependence on transfer revenues for metropolitan 
municipalities has increased since the 2012 legislation (which went into force in April 2014). 
In 2015 more than 75 percent of metropolitan municipal revenues came from transfers. On a 
positive note, these are unconditional transfers (the share of conditional transfers is less than 3 
percent of total revenues), thus municipalities have the power to use transfer revenues according 
to their own needs and choices.
In terms of own source revenues, interestingly enough, smaller municipalities, such as district/
township and provincial center municipalities, raise more own source revenues than larger more 
urbanized metropolitan municipalities. This is counterintuitive. One would expect that municipalities in 
metropolitan jurisdictions would be able to raise more own source revenues than smaller municipalities 
in rural areas. This is a direct result of intergovernmental fiscal policy choices of the central government.
29 Buoyancy is an indicator to measure efficiency and responsiveness of revenue mobilization in response 
to growth in the gross domestic product.
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Table 7: Breakdown of Municipal Revenues (2010-2015) (%)
Conditional 
Transfers (A)
Unconditional 
Transfers
(B)
Own Source 
Revenues (C)
Total
Revenues
(A)+(B)+(C)
2010 MM 0.27 65.52 34.41 100
D&T 1.19 42.06 56.75 100
PC 0.66 46.69 52.65 100
2011 MM 0.55 66.64 30.08 100
D&T 1.22 41.72 57.06 100
PC 0.98 48.96 50.05 100
2012 MM 0.29 70.02 30.33 100
D&T 1.05 41.66 57.29 100
PC 0.62 47.81 51.57 100
2013 MM 0.33 68.05 31.97 100
D&T 1.35 40.58 58.06 100
PC 0.61 50.17 49.23 100
2014 MM 0.41 67.19 32.58 100
D&T 2.63 42.93 54.44 100
PC 1.19 55.35 43.46 100
2015 MM 0.65 75.60 23.75 100
D&T 2.52 44.46 53.01 100
PC 1.52 55.63 42.85 100
2016
MM 0.49 75.42 24.09 100
D&T 2.66 41.81 55.53 100
PC 1.80 54.86 43.34 100
MM=Metropolitan Municipalities; D&T=District and Township Municipalities (including district munici-
palities within the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities); PC= Provincial Center Municipalities.
Source: Calculated by the authors from data on www.muhasebat.gov.tr (Ministry of Finance General Dire-
ctorate of Public Accounts).
5.3. Financing the Fiscal Gap: Inter-governmental Transfer System Design
The Turkish intergovernmental transfer system has desirable features of predictability, 
simplicity, transparency as well as interregional equity (Yilmaz and Guner, 2013). The transfers 
from central government to local governments consist mainly of formula-based block grants 
which are buoyant and predictable (Guner and Yilmaz, 2006). There is a formula for both 
the transfer pool amount (vertical imbalance) and allocation to individual local governments 
(horizontal imbalance).
The Municipalities Law no 6360 introduced major changes in the percentages of central government 
transfers (block grants) going to local authorities (see Table 8). With the reduction in the number of 
special provincial administrations, the law reduced the percentage of general tax revenues going to 
SPAs from 1.15 percent to 0.5 percent. In return, the share of district municipalities in metropolitan 
areas increased from 2.5 percent to 4.5 percent. Whereas, the share of municipalities outside of 
metropolitan jurisdiction was reduced from 2.85 percent to 1.5 percent (see Table 8).
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Table 8: Block Grants to Local Governments in Pre-6360 and Post-6360 Periods
Pre Municipalities Law no 6360 Post Municipalities Law no 6360
Special Provincial 
Administrations
1.15 percent of general budget tax 
revenues were transferred to 81 SPAs 
based on population (50 %), geographic 
size (10%), number of villages 
(10%), rural population (15%) and 
development index (15%).
0.5 percent of general budget tax 
revenues are transferred to 51 SPAs 
based on population (50 %), geographic 
size (10%), number of villages 
(10%), rural population (15%) and 
development index (15%).
Municipalities within 
Metropolitan Areas
2.5 percent of general budget 
tax revenues were transferred to 
municipalities within metropolitan 
municipality jurisdictions according to 
their population. These municipalities 
shared their transfer revenue with their 
respective metropolitan municipality 
(30 %) and water and sewage authority 
(10 %) in their metropolitan area.
4.5 percent of general budget 
tax revenues are transferred to 
municipalities within metropolitan 
municipality jurisdictions according to 
their population (90 %) and geographic 
size (10 %). These municipalities 
share their transfer revenue with their 
respective metropolitan municipality 
(30 %) and water and sewage authority 
(10 %) in their metropolitan area.
Municipalities outside 
of Metropolitan Areas
2.85 percent of general budget 
tax revenues were transferred to 
municipalities outside of metropolitan 
municipality jurisdictions according 
to their population (80 %) and 
development index (20 %).
1.50 percent of general budget 
tax revenues are transferred to 
municipalities outside of metropolitan 
municipality jurisdictions according 
to their population (80 %) and 
development index (20 %).
Source: Adopted from Arıkboğa (2015).
The new law also revamped the intergovernmental transfers system for the metropolitan 
municipalities (see Table 9). It increased the total resources going to metropolitan municipalities 
by increasing the percentage from 5 percent to 6 percent. But only 60 percent of these resources 
go directly to metropolitan municipalities on derivation basis and the rest is distributed across all 
metropolitan municipalities based on population (70 %) and geographic size (30 %).
Table 9: Intergovernmental Transfers for Metropolitan Municipalities
Pre Municipalities Law no 6360 Post Municipalities Law no 6360
1.Derivation Based Transfers: 5 percent of general budget 
tax revenues collected in metropolitan jurisdictions were 
transferred to 16 metropolitan municipalities based on two 
criteria: (i) place (70 %) and (ii) population (30 %). In other 
words, out of 5 percent of general government revenues 
collected in one metropolitan municipality jurisdiction 
only 70 % of those revenues stay in that metropolitan 
municipality. The remaining 30 % is redistributed to all 
metropolitan municipalities on population basis.
2.Shares from district municipalities: District municipalities 
within metropolitan jurisdictions transferred 30 percent of 
their block grants to metropolitan municipalities.
1.Derivation Based Transfers: 6 percent of general budget 
tax revenues collected in metropolitan jurisdictions are 
transferred to 30 metropolitan municipalities based on 
two criteria: (i) place (60 %) and (ii) the rest (40 %) with 
population (% 70) and geographic size (30 %). In other 
words, out of 6 percent of general government revenues 
collected in one metropolitan municipality jurisdiction 
only 60 % of those revenues stay in that metropolitan 
municipality. The remaining 40 % is redistributed to all 
metropolitan municipalities based on population (70 %) 
and geographic size (30 %).
2.Shares from district municipalities: District municipalities 
within metropolitan jurisdictions transferred 30 percent of 
their block grants to metropolitan municipalities.
Source: Adopted from Arıkboğa (2015).
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5.4. Local Government Borrowing
Local governments are allowed to borrow within the rules set by law and under the supervision of 
the central government (in the case of foreign borrowing). The Municipalities Law no 6360 made no 
changes on borrowing. In Turkey, over 95 percent of the local government debt stock is carried by 
municipalities (see Table 10). Metropolitan municipalities are the main borrowers followed by district 
municipalities due to the infrastructure investment needs of the urban jurisdictions (see Table 11).
Table 10: Debt Stock of Local Governments (%)
SPAs Municipalities Total
2010 3,06 96,94 100
2011 4,13 95,87 100
2012 3,72 96,28 100
2013 4,18 95,82 100
2014 1,88 98,12 100
2015 2,04 97,96 100
Source: Calculated by the authors from data on www.muhasebat.gov.tr (Ministry of Finance General Dire-
ctorate of Public Accounts).
Table 11: Debt Stock of Municipalities by Type (%)
M PC D&T Total
2010 59,59 8,62 31,8 100
2011 55,37 10,28 34,35 100
2012 52,33 10,98 36,69 100
2013 48,96 11,46 39,58 100
2014 54,59 7,22 38,19 100
2015 54,94 7,06 38,01 100
M=Metropolitan Municipalities; D&T=District and Township Municipalities (including district municipa-
lities within the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities); PC= Provincial Center Municipalities.
Source: Calculated by the authors from data on www.muhasebat.gov.tr (Ministry of Finance General Di-
rectorate of Public Accounts).
5.5. Making Local Finances Publicly Accountable
In Turkey, the downward accountability linkages between citizens and local governments are very 
weak. There are important barriers in front of accessing financial information in the municipal 
sector. The two issues that are particularly problematic: debt deductions from transfer revenues 
and municipality owned enterprises.
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In case of debt delinquency on part of municipalities, the Provinces Bank (İlbank A.Ş.) 
is used by the government as a device for deduction at the source. 30 In the past, the 
Provinces Bank provided information about the amount of transfers to local governments 
and the deduction amounts by municipality. However, after the change of the status of 
the Provinces Bank to a joint stock company in February 2011, it has stopped providing 
detailed information about deductions at the source. 31 Although Turkey has enacted a 
Right to Information Act in 2003, the Provinces Bank hides behind the Banking Law in 
rejecting the requests for information. More importantly, central government’s power of 
deduction at the source without any early warning has a detrimental effect on the stability 
and predictability of the transfer system.
In terms of financial information, another problematic area is the finances of municipality owned 
enterprises. Financial information about municipality owned enterprises is not publicly available 
as they are regulated by the commercial law.
As for local participation, there are no mechanisms to involve citizens in local planning and 
budgeting processes. More importantly, recent studies documented patronage politics in 
municipalities. Municipalities use their power in the delivery of public goods and services to 
pursue distributive politics (Bayraktar and Altan, 2013). In addition, they engage in vote buying 
by distributing appliances, coal and food baskets (Eligur, 2009). Furthermore, in a recent study, 
Aytac (2014) analyzed the distributive politics features of another central government program, 
Turkey’s Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program. He documents how the program is used 
as a tool for patronage politics by its executive committee through the discretionary enrollment 
at the local level. In this setting, the control of metropolitan municipalities is particularly 
important to increase possibilities for winning national elections (Sayari, 2014).
An important tool in meddling with local affairs is the Mass Housing Administration (Toplu Konut 
İdaresi—TOKI). The ruling party uses TOKI as a tool for patronage politics. 32 The involvement 
of TOKI in electoral politics is very visible at the local level. TOKI plays a key role in providing 
jobs, contracts and subsidized housing at the local level. By using time series data across 900 
municipalities, Marschall, Aydogan and Bulut (2016) shows the linkage between TOKI housing 
30 The intergovernmental transfers are channeled to municipalities and SPAs through the Provinces 
Bank, except metropolitan municipality transfers which are directly deposited to the metropolitan 
municipalities’ account by the Ministry of Finance. In case of debt delinquency on part of municipalities, 
the Provinces Bank is used for deductions up to 40 percent from their transfer revenues. The decision 
on the percentage rests with the council of ministers.
31 Only a global figure of the transfers to SPAs and municipalities is published in their Annual Report.
32 The ruling party government increased the power and autonomy of TOKI over the years and eventually 
moved it directly under the authority of the Prime Minister. The government also amended the Public 
Management and Control Law (No. 5018) exempting TOKI from auditing requirements. With enhanced 
powers, TOKI has a market share of 10 percent in construction sector. TOKI and municipalities have 
the authority to make decisions related to the size, type and plans of housing projects. Therefore, 
both TOKI and municipalities have considerable discretion over huge infrastructure investments 
affecting the housing, employment, and amenities of local residents. Gurakar (2016) documents how 
construction firms receiving contracts from TOKI are related to the ruling party.
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projects and likelihood of the ruling party wining the elections. According to their analysis, in 
districts where TOKI makes investments, the likelihood of the ruling party’s wining local elections 
is greatly enhanced.
6. Conclusion
Municipal amalgamation has attracted significant attention as a remedy for inefficient service 
delivery. However, there seems to be a marked disjoint between theory and empirical evidence. 
Although countries consider municipal amalgamation as a means to lower service delivery costs, 
empirical findings suggest that benefits and costs of an amalgamation is country specific (Fox and 
Gurley, 2006). As the Turkish case illustrates, local government reform is a complex process with 
impact on political, administrative and fiscal dimensions. Partial reforms often fail to increase the 
autonomy and discretion of local governments in these dimensions. In addition, they fall short 
of improving accountability incentive structures that are crucial to obtain more responsive and 
accountable local governance.
In Turkey, the policy objective of the second generation local government reform was to achieve 
economies of scale in the delivery of municipal services through amalgamation of municipalities 
and dissolution of SPAs and villages. 33 Overall the changes failed to strengthen downward 
accountability linkages and enhancing the participation of vulnerable groups in local governance. 
Furthermore, they were introduced in a very top-down manner without any consultation with 
broader stakeholders; nearly half of the municipalities were abolished without holding referendum 
or consulting to the citizens.
Indirect election of metropolitan municipal councilors, existence of 10 percent threshold as well 
as the lack of quotas for vulnerable groups and women are major weaknesses the reforms could 
have addressed. On a positive note, however, the extension of the metropolitan municipality 
boundaries symbolically brings the elected metropolitan municipality mayor to the same level as 
the appointed governor of the province.
In terms of administrative system, the new legislation established a directorate of investment 
monitoring and coordination (DIMC) in metropolitan municipal areas to coordinate 
investment decisions. It is too early to make judgement call about DIMCs but from the outset 
it seems one type of local unit - SPA - has been replaced with another - DIMC - without elected 
leadership.
In terms of fiscal discretion and accountability, the extension of geographic boundaries of 
municipalities without reforming service delivery responsibilities was a missed opportunity 
to address the confusion in service delivery responsibilities between district and metropolitan 
municipalities. The recent changes have also failed to address the fluctuation of local government 
revenues and the reliance of metropolitan municipalities on transfer revenues. The Municipalities 
33 30 SPAs, 1591 municipalities and 16082 villages were dissolved.
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Law no 6360 introduced major changes in the percentages of general tax revenues going to local 
governments. These changes have increased the share of intergovernmental transfers in total 
revenues for all types of local governments. The increase is most significant in metropolitan 
municipalities where more than 75 percent of total revenues come from transfers. The preliminary 
results show that the recent changes in the design of the intergovernmental fiscal system do 
not strengthen fiscal autonomy of local governments. On the contrary, local governments are 
becoming heavily dependent on central government transfers. The decline in the share of own-
source revenues weakens the downward accountability linkage towards citizens. The only positive 
aspect of these changes is that there is no conditionality imposed on transfer revenues—they are 
mainly unconditional for municipalities.
Last but not least, the biggest challenge for Turkey is to avoid clientelistic and patronage politics 
at the local level. In-kind and cash handouts in return for votes is a major setback for efforts 
to strengthen downward accountability. More importantly, the increased role of TOKI in local 
affairs is major concern for corruption watchers.
All in all, it is impossible to unequivocally say that the recent changes have had a positive 
effect on local discretion and accountability in Turkey. As a matter of fact, with the worsening 
of the dependence of metropolitan municipalities on transfer revenues and deterioration of 
accountability and transparency institutions, one may say that these changes might have worsened 
local discretion and accountability.
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